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OKLAHOMA'S STATE/TRIBAL WATER COMPACT: THREE
CHEERS FOR COMPROMISE
Jennifer E. Pelphrey*
I. Introduction
In 2001, the State of Oklahoma and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes of
Oklahoma negotiated a compact for water rights. This State/Tribal Water
Compact (the Compact) helped avoid the possibility of years of litigation and
expense in pursuit of a water rights allocation settlement among these parties.
The Compact was presented to the Oklahoma state legislature for approval in
February 2002, but is currently on hold pending a further study of Oklahoma's
water needs. The state legislature also imposed a three year moratorium on
water sales during the time necessary to complete the study. When the time
comes for the Oklahoma legislature to reconsider this Compact, it should be
approved as a valuable compromise that is good for both the State and the
Tribes involved.
This Comment will discuss the historical background that gives the Choctaw
and Chickasaw Tribes a nonfrivolous claim to the water in southeastern
Oklahoma and why compacting is a desirable method to resolve water rights
issues with the State. It will then outline a similar tribal-state compact recently
enacted in Florida, and discuss the Oklahoma Compact as it is currently drafted.
Finally, it will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the draft Compact from the
point of view of the Tribes and address some of the mainstream public concerns
about the Compact and the possibility of resulting water sales. The conclusion
will endorse the usefulness of this Compact as a means to further economic
growth in the State of Oklahoma.
II. Why the Tribes Have a Legitimate Claim to Water Rights
A. The Appropriative and Riparian Doctrines and Oklahoma's Dual System
The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations have laid claim to the water on their
lands in southeastern Oklahoma under several authorities. The first authority is
enforcement of their riparian water rights. Water rights are typically classified
as either riparian or appropriative rights. A riparian property owner may use any
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
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water running through or beside his land.' This right to use "runs with the
land,"2 and is not forfeited by non-use.3 Riparian rights cannot be quantified,
because the only limit to the amount of water each riparian owner may use is an
amount that is "reasonable."
4
The alternative classification is appropriative water rights. The appropriative
system uses a "first in time, first in right" rule when there is a shortage,' and
recognizes a right to the water only when it is continuously applied to a
"beneficial use."6 The appropriative system is typically used in arid regions
where water shortages are common.7
Oklahoma has traditionally used a "dual" water rights system, combining the
appropriative and riparian systems because the western half of the state is arid
and the eastern half is not.8 In 1963, the Oklahoma legislature amended state
statutes to restrict future riparian rights and adopted a "unitary" appropriation
system,9 but the "dual" system was reinstated after the 1990 Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision in Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water
Resources Board held that the statutory amendments would allow for
unconstitutional takings of unused riparian rights still available for future use.'°
Riparian water rights exercised under state law are to be governed by the
following rules established in Franco-American: "(1) the modified common law
riparian right to the reasonable use of the stream is the controlling law in
Oklahoma; and (2) the statutory right to appropriate water does not preempt or
diminish the riparian common law right."" Under these guidelines, it seems that
1. Taiawagi Helton, Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma,
33 TULSA L.J. 979, 983 (1998).
2. WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 400 (4th ed. 2004)
[hereinafter NUTSHELL].
3. Id.
4. Helton, supra note 1, at 983 (quotations in original omitted); see also WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(d)(2) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., 2001 repl. vol.) (discussing the term
"reasonableness" as a relationship).
5. Jessica Bacal, The Shadow of Lone Wolf: Native Americans Confront Risks of
Quantification of Their Reserved Water Rights, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 1, 16 (1991)
(quotations in original omitted).
6. Helton, supra note 1, at 983-84 (citing Gary D. Allison, Franco-American Charolaise:
The Never Ending Story, 30 TULSA L.J. 1, 6-7 (1994)).
7. Id. at 983.
8. Id. at 984.
9. Id. at 986.
10. Id.; see Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 577
(Okla. 1990).
11. Lisa McDonnell, Promotion of Ecological and Conservation Values Under the
Decision in Franco, in THE IMPACT OF FRANcO-AMERICAN CHAROLAISE, LTD. V. OKLAHOMA
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Choctaw and Chickasaw claims to water rights under the riparian doctrine of
reasonable use would be upheld because riparian rights have priority over prior
appropriators. 2
B. The Winters Doctrine and Reserved Rights
The full consequences of the Franco-American decision to the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Tribes are somewhat unclear because a state court decision does not
apply to the Tribes' federally issued reserved water rights under the Winters
doctrine.' 3 When the federal government moved Indian tribes onto reservations,
it created Indian water rights by allowing the Tribes enough water to use the
reserved land for its intended purpose. 4 Even if the agreements creating these
Indian reservations did not specifically mention water, the federal government
knew that the displaced Tribes would require water if they were to fulfill the
government's purpose of becoming a "pastoral and civilized people."' 5
Reserved Indian water rights do not require current "beneficial use,"' 6 and the
rights are retained even if the water is not used. 7 Winters v. United States"s was
the first case to adopt the view that tribal water rights do exist, and courts have
followed the "Winters doctrine" in determining outcomes in subsequent water
rights litigation.
C. The Five Tribes Doctrine
Southeast Oklahoma is unique from other tribal reservation areas because of
the Five Tribes doctrine. 9 The federal government removed the Five Civilized
WATER RESOURCES BOARD 249, 252 (Drew L. Kershen ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPACT OF
FRANCO-AMERICAN] (quoting Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 575-76) (quotations in original
omitted).
12. Michelle Lynn Gibbens, Is Franco Moot When It Comes to Tribal and Interstate Claims
to Oklahoma Water?, in IMPACT OF FRANCO-AMERICAN, supra note 11, at 219, 243. The
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations' lands are located in the eastern non-arid portion of Oklahoma,
which has traditionally used the riparian water rights system.
13. See id. at 243.
14. Karen Crass, Eroding the Winters Right: Non-Indian Water Users' Attempt to Limit
the Scope of the Indian Superior Entitlement to Western Water to Prevent Tribes from Water
Brokering, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 109, 111 (1997).
15. Helton, supra note 1, at 988 (quoting Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576
(1908)) (quotations in original omitted).
16. Bacal, supra note 5, at 18 (citing Note, A Proposal for the Quantification of Reserved
Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1302 (1974)).
17. NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 406.
18. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
19. See Helton, supra note 1, at 993.
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Tribes to specific unsettled lands within the Indian Territory. 20 At that time it
also granted federal land patents to the Five Tribes and the Tribes were
authorized to issue tribal patents in the case of a transfer of their tribal land.2'
The doctrine holds that this "permanent homeland ' 22 includes rights to all the
water within it, notjust enough to fulfill the land's purpose, as under the Winters
doctrine.23 In addition, the Supreme Court has held in past decisions that the
federal government conveyed specific lands directly to Indian tribes,24 and that
a state that later enveloped tribal land did not inherit rights to the water on that
land.25  The Tribes also point to Oklahoma's 1906 Enabling Act, federal
legislation which says that the State Constitution shall not limit the rights held
by the Indians of Oklahoma.26 The Oklahoma State Constitution, as adopted in
1907, further provides that non-Indian inhabitants of the State do not have rights
to Indian lands.27 The Five Tribes doctrine emphasizes that under federal
legislation treating the Five Tribes differently from other tribes on reservations,
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes in southeastern Oklahoma would own all the
water on their lands, and would not be subject to state authority as to its use or
non-use.
D. Federal Treaties
As further evidence of the water rights possessed by the Five Civilized
Tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws point to specific treaties between them
and the United States government signed during the 1830s.2" The treaties
indicated that these Tribes would be provided land to inhabit without
interference from the government.29 The Choctaws point specifically to the
20. Id. The Five Civilized Tribes include the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Seminole,
and Creek Nations.
21. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Status Report on the Joint State/Tribal Water
Compact and Water Marketing Proposals, Status Report to the Office of the Governor 12 (Mar.
2002), available at http://www.owrb.state.ok.us/studies/legislative/southeast/se-plan.php#status
[hereinafter Status Report].
22. Helton, supra note 1, at 993.
23. Id. at 994-95.
24. Gibbens, supra note 12, at 238 (citing Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,635
(1970)).
25. Id. at 238 (citing United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960)). The
Cherokee Tribe was one of the Five Civilized Tribes relocated to Oklahoma.
26. Status Report, supra note 21, at 12; see also Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 461 F.2d
674 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
27. Status Report, supra note 21, at 12-13.
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id.
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1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek,3" in which the federal government issued
to them land and water rights in southeastern Oklahoma.3 The Treaty promises
that the Choctaw Nation will have
jurisdiction and government of all the persons and property that may
be within their limits west, so that no Territory or State shall ever
have a right to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw
Nation ... and that no part of the land granted to them shall ever be
embraced in any Territory or State.32
Under this Treaty, the Choctaw rights to the water within its tribal boundaries
were conveyed with the land. The Chickasaws signed a similar federal treaty in
1832.3"
E. Tribal Authority
Once the Tribes have established their rights to the water on their lands, they
need to show the authority to negotiate with the State on behalf of their
members. The Tribes have the authority to enter into agreements because they
hold these water rights in trust for the tribal members. 4 The court in Hayes v.
Barringer35 decided that lands held by the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations at
that time were held
in trust for the individual members of their tribes .... were public
lands, and, while the enrolled members of these tribes undoubtedly
had a vested equitable right to their just share of them against
strangers and fellow members of their tribes, they had no separate or
individual right to or equity in any of these lands which they could
maintain against the legislation of the United States or of the Indian
Nations.36
30. Treaty with the Choctaw, Sept. 27, 1830, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, 7 Stat. 333. This treaty
is also called the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.
31. Memorandum on the Sale of Water to North Texas, Choctaw Nation 2 (Nov. 2001) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Choctaw Nation Memorandum] (citing Treaty with the Choctaw,
supra note 30).
32. Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note 30, at art. 4.
33. Treaty with the Chickasaw, Oct. 20, 1832, U.S.-Chickasaw Nation, 7 Stat. 381.
34. Choctaw Nation Memorandum, supra note 31, at 4.
35. 168 F. 221 (8th Cir. 1909).
36. Choctaw Nation Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5 (quoting Hayes, 168 F. at 222)
(quotations in original omitted); see also Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899);
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903); Wallace v. Adams, 143 F. 716 (1906); Ligon v. Johnston, 164 F. 670 (1908) (cases
No. 1] NOTES
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This reasoning still applies today and gives the Tribes the authority to enter into
a compact with Oklahoma.
This background set the stage for the possibility of a long and torturous road
of litigation between the Tribes and the State to clearly define which parties are
entitled to rights and use of water in specific areas. These parties undoubtedly
considered all their settlement options before deciding to negotiate a compact.
III. Alternatives to Compacting
There are several settlement options outside of compacting that parties could
consider before any water rights negotiations begin, such as legislation,
contracts, or litigation.37 The most viable alternative in many situations is
litigation. Litigation is attractive because it settles the legal questions at issue
with finality and is therefore the most effective means of quantifying rights,38
but there are also many drawbacks that may discourage parties from pursuing
this option. Litigation has "proven [in many situations] to be a circuitous and
hazard-strewn route. 39
The costs of litigation can be prohibitive. For example, in one Wyoming
water rights suit, the Wind River Tribes estimated spending over $9 million
dollars defending their rights, while the State of Wyoming spent almost $10
million, the Bureau of Indian Affairs spent almost $2 million and the United
States Justice Department spent over $850,000.4 These costs encompassed only
the legal and consulting fees resulting from the litigation.4' Additionally, once
a verdict was reached, the parties would have to pay for any storage or facility
construction costs that were deemed necessary.42
cited by the Hayes court).
37. Bacal, supra note 5, at 25 (citing John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated
Agreements to Resolve Water Disputes Involving Indian Water Rights, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J.
63, 70-71 (1988)). Professor Folk-Williams asserts that a contract could be used if the parties
want to resolve conflicts on a narrow issue, but do not need to negotiate problems of legal
entitlement. Legislation would be a good choice if a party is seeking additional funding.
Litigation would result in a declaration of rights binding on all the parties.
38. See Bacal, supra note 5, at 25.
39. Id. at 25-26 (quoting David H. Getches, Management and Marketing ofIndian Water:
From Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 521 (1988)) (quotations in original
omitted).
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Litigation can also be quite time-consuming. Suits can often continue for up
to fifteen or twenty years,43 and courts usually are not willing to decide water
administration issues until water rights are quantified.' This means that no
action can be taken until the water rights litigation is fully completed. Even
when ajudgment is rendered, the next steps are often uncertain. A court verdict
delivers only "paper rights"45 and not any actual water or funding to use the
water.46 This could be a problem when Indians on a tribal reservation are
dependent on funding from the federal government for their actual water usage.47
Furthermore, because the federal government would be acting as a trustee for
the tribes in representing their interests in litigation, if the litigation were
unsuccessful the Indian tribes would have to show an "abuse of discretion by the
government" 48 to prove that they deserved a further opportunity to develop their
case in court.4 9 Bias may also be an issue because states will be litigating
against the tribes in state courts,50 and state courts may not be experts on the
federal water laws they are charged with enforcing.
Because both the State and the Tribes came to see that litigation was a less
than ideal solution, they decided to consider an alternative - compacting.
IV. Compacting
Both the State of Oklahoma and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes can
show legitimate claims to the water rights in southeastern Oklahoma. This fact
provides them a good reason to work together to resolve their differences and to
be able to mutually benefit from possible water sales to other states in the future.
Compacting is a good option for these parties because it is effective in solving
jurisdictional and quantification problems.52 The Supreme Court has indicated
43. Gina McGovern, Settlement or Adjudication: Resolving Indian Reserved Rights, 36
ARIz. L. REV. 195, 197 n.19 (1994).
44. Peter W. Sly & Cheryl A. Maier, Indian Water Settlements and EPA, 5 SPG NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 23, 24 (1991).
45. Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers,
30 TULSA L.J. 61, 100 (1994).
46. Id.
47. Bacal, supra note 5, at 27 (citing Note, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters of
Our Discontent, 88 YALE L.J. 1689, 1703 (1979)).
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 29.
51. McGovern, supra note 43, at 201-02.
52. Bacal, supra note 5, at 25.
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its preference for settling water rights issues out of court,53 and there are several
advantages to reaching a settlement.
Working out a settlement agreement provides a good opportunity for the
parties to openly negotiate the issues.54 Because the parties are not pressured to
agree on each issue, they may more freely discuss their differences. The parties
do not have to settle all their differences at once and can reach a compromise
instead of a final determinative judgment." The talks can also encompass other
issues such as the administration of regulations or the possibility of water sales.56
Perhaps one of the most attractive qualities of settling through a compact is the
shorter period of time in which an agreement can be reached.57
Once a compact is approved, each party to the compact must adhere to its
provisions unless they all agree to change or abandon the compact.58 This fact
provides the parties enough security to take the process seriously.
V. The Florida Seminole Compact
A. Background
The Seminole Water Rights Compact of 198751 provides a model for any
proposed Oklahoma state/tribal compact because it represents the initial
recognition of Indian water rights in a riparian state, in this case Florida.' The
Seminole Water Compact was part of a larger agreement dealing with land
claims in addition to water claims. 6' The parties acknowledged that although
53. John H. Davidson, Indian Water Rights, the Missouri River, and the Administrative
Process: What Are the Questions?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 2 (2000); Sly & Maier, supra
note 44, at 25; see, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943); Wyoming v. United
States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989); Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
54. McGovern, supra note 43, at 197 n.19 (1994) (citing Susanna Eden & Mary G.
Wallace, University of Arizona Water Resources Research Center, Arizona Water Information
and Issues, 29-30 (1992)).
55. See Sly & Maier, supra note 44, at 25.
56. See McGovern, supra note 43, at 197 n.19.
57. See id. The Oklahoma legislature authorized state officials to begin water resource
development discussions with the Tribes in May 1999 and the parties had released the draft
Compact by November 2001.
58. Davidson, supra note 53, at 2 (citing State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28
(1951)).
59. See Jim Shore & Jerry C. Straus, The Seminole Water Rights Compact and the Seminole
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1990).
60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. at 3. The larger agreement is called the Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement
Act of 1987.
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conflicts over land titles had initially prompted negotiations for a settlement,
resolution of conflicts over water rights and state jurisdiction issues would be
just as important for a lasting compromise.62
Tribal concerns about water rights in Florida began when citrus and other
types of businesses near the Seminoles' West Big Cypress Reservation began
planning groundwater diversions.63 The Tribe realized that these plans could
have a negative effect on its own reservation's groundwater. 64 In addition, canal
water to which the Tribe was entitled under a state permit system was routinely
not available due to mismanagement of the canal system.65 The Seminole Tribe
also had problems with neighboring landowners improperly diverting water onto
or away from tribal land.' Therefore, the Tribe realized that it would have to
take action to protect and enforce its water rights.
Meanwhile, the State of Florida enacted a comprehensive Water Resources
Act that established a regulatory system for water rights.67 The conflict between
the State and Tribe came to a head when the Seminoles argued that the State had
no right to dictate how the Tribe conducted its own activities on its own land and
refused to comply with the State's regulations.68 The Tribe adopted the Winters
doctrine rationale for its water claims and also argued that, in the alternative,
they had riparian and groundwater use rights.69 The two sides found themselves
at an impasse and agreed that, due to the drawbacks of litigation, negotiating a
compact was the way to solve some major conflicts that needed attention before
they developed into an unmanageable situation.7 °
Through this settlement, the Tribe hoped to retain specific rights to enough
water to meet its current needs and sustain future growth while also shielding
itself from adjacent landowners who might infringe on those rights. 7' It also
hoped to maintain a measure of independence from state regulation.72
Knowing that the Tribe was looking to maintain some independence from
state regulation, the State pursued "an enforceable commitment from the
62. See id. at 7.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. id. at 9.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 14.
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Tribe"73 in which the Tribe would agree to not undermine Florida's water and
environmental policies in administrating its own regulatory policies.74
B. Seminole Compact Provisions
The Seminole Compact successfully addressed both tribal and state concerns,
and the Tribe was able to keep its autonomy from state regulation. It agreed to
comply with the "essential terms and principles of the state [water management]
system"75 without having to follow the letter of state law.76 In return for the
State's nonintervention, the Seminole Tribe agreed to comply with the State's
water management guidelines through its own water code, and agreed to submit
to personal jurisdiction in federal court if it did not adhere to the terms of the
Compact.77
The Seminole Compact was a successful compromise because both sides
gave up something of value in order to gain an equally valuable benefit. The
Tribe retained its water rights without risking an unfavorable court ruling, but
also gave up the possibility of expanding the scope of those rights through a
favorable court ruling.78 The State acknowledged the validity of the current
tribal water rights but also gained immediate tribal compliance with the goals of
its water management system.
79
C. Comparison to Oklahoma Compact
In comparing the Seminole Compact with the Oklahoma Compact, one can
see that the "something of value" that a tribe is willing to give up can mean very
different things in different situations. While the Seminole Compact was
spurred by Florida' s lack of acknowledgement of tribal water entitlements and
the implementation of a regulatory system that the Tribe refused to
acknowledge, Oklahoma's State/Tribal Compact came about because the Tribes
wanted the opportunity to benefit from the water resource the State was
proposing to sell. Therefore, the results of the two compacts, and the
compromises to which each of the Tribes necessarily agreed, corresponded with
those unique circumstances.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id. at 11-12.
75. Id. at 14 (quoting the Seminole Compact, which is published in Seminole Indian Land
Claims Settlement Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 1684 Before the Senate Select Comm 'n on
Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 83-122 (1987)) (quotations in original omitted).
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id.
[Vol. 29
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In its negotiations with the State of Florida, the Seminole Tribe was
interested in retaining its autonomy and did not want to relinquish any
administrative control to the State. The Choctaws and Chickasaws, on the other
hand, were willing to give Oklahoma administrative control in return for a
portion of any net revenue generated by future water sales. While the Seminoles
just wanted their fair share of land and water to use as a resource, the Choctaws
and Chickasaws were more interested in economic development that might be
encouraged by proper management of the valuable resource in abundance on
their lands. Thus, while the two compacts addressed many of the same issues
commonly confronted in a riparian state, they inevitably offered different
compromises that best suited the Tribes' differing objectives.
VI. Oklahoma StateiTribal Compact
A. Background
The State of Oklahoma owes the federal government approximately $38
million8" in outstanding debt relating to construction of Sardis Lake by the Army
Corps of Engineers between 1975 and 1982.81 Through the provisions of the
Sardis Lake Water Storage Contract, if the State pays this debt, the federal
government will allow it to use Sardis Lake as a reservoir for part of its water
supply.82 In order to fund debt payments, the State began to explore the
possibility of water development in southeastern Oklahoma, including water
sales.83 Once the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations learned that State officials
had begun negotiations with the North Texas Municipal Water District in 1992,
they laid claim to the water the State was proposing to sell.84 They claimed
rights to this water based on the historical events discussed above.
Formal authorization for the State to pursue discussions with the Tribes
regarding water development plans did not come until May 1999, when the
Oklahoma legislature adopted House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) 1066.85 At
80. Status Report, supra note 21, at 43.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 3. From 1984 to 1989, Oklahoma made its annual debt payments. The legislature
decided not to authorize further payments after 1989, but two more payments were made in
1997 and 1998. The State has paid the Army Corps of Engineers a grand total of approximately
$4.4 million, leaving an outstanding balance of approximately $38 million, including late
payment interest. See also the Sardis Water Storage Contract Payments chart found in id. at 4.
83. Id. at 1.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 14-15; see H.R. Con. Res. 1066, 1999 Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1999). House
Resolution 1066 authorized the Oklahoma Water Resources Board to conduct meetings with
No. 1]
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this point, the two sides began initial discussions on the possibility of a water
rights compact, and these discussions eventually led to the November 2001
unveiling of the draft State/Tribal Water Compact.8 Twenty-two southern
Oklahoma counties are included within the Compact's parameters, and a portion
of the land included was once Choctaw and Chickasaw tribal land. 7
The Compact area houses six major river basins which support these six
major reservoirs: Atoka Lake and McGee Creek Lake in the Muddy Boggy
Creek Basin, Sardis Lake and Hugo Lake in the Kiamichi River Basin, Pine
Creek Lake in the Little River Basin, and Broken Bow Lake in the Mountain
Fork River Basin.88 The Clear Boggy and Blue River Basins are the other two
river basins included in the Compact area.89
B. Main Provisions
The Compact is a compromise agreement between the Tribes and the State
that impacts management of the water existing in the Compact area.9 The
purposes of the Compact include "resolv[ing] mutually exclusive state-tribal
claims to water rights," "utilizing one set of water quality standards," and
"provid[ing] the framework for [further] economic development in
[southeastern] Oklahoma."'" The Compact will also establish a commission for
administrative purposes.92
1. Resolving Claims to Water Rights
As outlined above, the Tribes appear to have a legitimate, nonfrivolous claim
to water rights that the State also claims in southeastern Oklahoma. This
representatives of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations and empowered local citizens and
entities to formulate a comprehensive Kianichi River Basin Water Development Plan to address
water resources issues in the Kiamichi River Basin.
86. Id. at 6.
87. Id. at 16. The Compact applies to all or parts of the following counties: McCurtain,
LeFlore, Haskell, Latimer, Pushmataha, Choctaw, Bryan, Atoka, Pittsburg, Coal, Marshall,
Johnston, Pontotoc, Garvin, Murray, Carter, Love, McClain, Hughes, Jefferson, Stephens, and
Grady.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id.
90. Ray Carter, State-Tribal Water Compact Draft Unveiled, J. REC. (Okla. City), Nov. 15,
2001, available at 2001 WL 4527561.
91. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Status Report on the Joint State/Tribal Water
Compact and Water Marketing Proposals, Draft State/Tribal Water Compact, Public
Discussion Draft 1 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.owrb.state.ok.us/studiesllegislative/
southeast/se-plan.php#status [hereinafter Water Compact].
92. Id. at 14.
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Compact specifies a release of tribal claims to the "appropriation rights to
stream water" in the Compact area and allocation rights to the use of
groundwater in the Compact area."93 This means that the State would have full
water rights administration authority.9 The terms of the Compact include the
opportunity for the Tribes to have input on any changes proposed for water use
rules and permit applications in the Compact area, and further opportunity for
arbitration to block undesirable water uses or amendments to the Compact.95
The Compact allows for arbitration in cases where changes to the Compact
negatively affect the economic security or sovereignty of the Tribes, violate
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) rules or current water marketing
contracts, or allow for water use in quantities "in excess of [an applicant's]
present or future needs."'96
The Compact further emphasizes guidelines for water use and water
resources development by ranking water users in order of priority.97 Users with
the highest priority are those located in the affected counties in southeastern
Oklahoma. 98 The next priority is the remainder of Oklahomans. 99 The third
consideration is for maintaining adequate lake and reservoir levels in the
Compact area, followed by consideration for any necessary "water and
wastewater infrastructure projects" in the area."° State, tribal, and municipal
obligations to the United States for water storage construction and maintenance
costs, river integrity, and wildlife protection areas adjacent to the reservoirs
complete the priority list for those affected by the Compact.'°'
The Compact allows for the possibility of out-of-state water sales as
negotiated by state officials only after approval by the Tribes, the Oklahoma
Governor, and the state legislature. °2 Such a sale contract could not continue
indefinitely, and would have to include an express rejection of potential
"downstream dependency" claims.'0 3 A sale contract would also have to allow
for alteration of the agreement to raise water prices and allow for reduction of
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 4-6.
96. Id. at 5-6.
97. Id. at 6-7.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 6-7.
101. Id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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water supply based on emergency situations.'" Sales of groundwater would be
off limits, as would sales of water for recreational purposes.0 5 The water sold
would have to be water that the buyer actually needs."06
2. Water Quality Standards
Congress' Clean Water Act did not include water quality regulations directly
aimed at tribal lands, but tribes may be indirectly affected by state programs
enacted to comply with this Act.'0 7 Because of this fact, an Indian tribe can
apply to the federal government for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
treatment as a state.' 8 This "tribe as state" (TAS) status allows a tribe to assume
responsibility for many aspects of federal environmental programs on its
lands."° For a tribe to qualify for TAS status, the Administrator of the EPA
must determine that the tribe has "a governing body that has authority to carry
out substantial governmental powers and duties," '' that the tribe can "[carry]
out the functions of an effective water quality standards program,""' and that the
tribe has the "capability to administer such a program."" 2
The Compact allows the Tribes to adopt Oklahoma's water quality standards
or to establish their own water quality standards in the event one of the Tribes
is approved for TAS treatment under the Clean Water Act.' ' 3 If the Tribe
qualifies under TAS status to adopt its own standards, those standards would
only apply to its own waters running through its land.' The Tribes would be
able to submit a claim for arbitration if they believe the State's proposed water
quality standards would negatively affect the water on their lands.' The State
would have the same claim for arbitration if it believes a tribal water quality
standard would negatively affect its own land." 6 The Compact emphasizes
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Jane Marx et al., Tribal Jurisdiction Over Reservation Water Quality and Quantity, 43
S.D. L. REv. 315, 325 (1998).
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Standards: Are There Any Limits?, 7 DuKE
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 367, 380 (1997) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b) (1996)).
111. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(4) (1996)) (quotations in original omitted).
112. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b) (1996)).
113. Water Compact, supra note 91, at 10; see 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000) (Oklahoma's water
quality standards and implementation plans); id. § 1377(e) (Indian tribes' treatment as states).
114. Water Compact, supra note 91, at 10.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id.
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NOTES
communication between parties so that neither side is negatively affected by the
other side's water quality decisions." 7
A good working relationship between parties will be vital when it comes to
water quality issues. Because water in a river, by its nature, continuously flows
and does not stay on any one parcel of land for long, it is very important for
upstream and downstream landowners to come to terms on acceptable water
quality standards.
3. Framework for Economic Development
Net revenue from any sale of water would be split evenly between the State
of Oklahoma and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes, giving "50% to the State,
37.5% to the Choctaw Nation, and 12.5% to the Chickasaw Nation."'" 8 Both the
Tribes and the State agree that revenues will be spent primarily on economic
development in the southeastern Oklahoma area affected by the Compact." 9
State spending could be for projects including water infrastructure development
and other economic development.1 °  Appointed citizens of southeastern
Oklahoma communities would be trustees of the funds and would see that they
were properly distributed. 12' The Tribes' revenues would be used "only for
economic development, education, tribal government [and] . . . service
programs,. . . health care, .. .housing,. . . and other similar programs" for their
members. 2 2
4. Compact Commission
The Compact also creates the Southeast Oklahoma State-Tribal
Intergovernmental Compact Commission (Commission). 23 The Commission
117. Id. at 11. Allowing tribes to regulate their own water quality may sometimes cause
problems. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993). The
Isleta Indian Pueblo in New Mexico applied and qualified for TAS status. The Pueblo then
adopted and the EPA approved a higher standard for the Pueblo's water quality, which was then
applied to the upstream city of Albuquerque. The city's costs skyrocketed as they were forced
to comply with the almost unattainable water quality standards set by the Pueblo. The
Oklahoma Compact seeks to avoid this type of problem by providing for tribal consultation, and
if necessary, arbitration, with the State prior to any implementation of stricter water quality
standards under TAS authority.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. at 8-9.
120. Id.
121. Carter, supra note 90, at4.
122. Water Compact, supra note 91, at 9.
123. Id. at 14 (quotations in original omitted).
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would be responsible for recommending changes to state and tribal laws and
rules, financing water monitoring, maintaining and operating the infrastructure,
administering water sale contracts, and obtaining financing for infrastructure
projects. 24
VI. Water Sale Contract Proposals
After HCR 1109 was passed by the Oklahoma legislature in May 2000, the
OWRB was free to accept proposals from outside parties for water sale
contracts.' 25 Two proposals in particular were pursued, and the OWRB staff,
along with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, held negotiations with these two
parties.126 The OWARB determined that, if approved, both of these water sales
could proceed simultaneously, while still maintaining adequate water supplies
for the people of Oklahoma. 127 As a safeguard, the Compact provides that every
"out of state use of water must be authorized by the [Oklahoma] Governor and
Tribal Nations and approved by the Oklahoma Legislature."'
128
A. North Texas Water Agency (NTWA)
The NTWA proposal sought to buy water from the Kiamichi, Little River,
and Mountain Fork Rivers129 in return for an approximate payment of $339
million over the life of the contract term.3 ' The NTWA would have also been
responsible for funding any "water transfer infrastructure"'' necessary to
complete the transfer.'32 Oklahoma citizens would have felt little or no impact
in water supply from this sale because the NTWA would have been allowed to
buy only excess "water flowing unused out of the State of Oklahoma into the
Red River or [into] ... Arkansas."'33 Discussions with the NTWA broke down
124. Id. at 15-17.
125. House Resolution 1109, in general, authorized the OWRB to develop a plan "to
efficiently utilize the water supplies of the Kiamichi River for the benefit of the Kiamichi River
basin region and adjacent regions in the state." H.R. Con. Res. 1109, 2000 Leg., 2000 Reg.
Sess. (Okla. 2000).
126. Status Report, supra note 21, at 8.
127. Id. at 24.
128. Water Compact, supra note 91, at 7.
129. Status Report, supra note 21, at 26.
130. Id. at 44.
131. ld. at 26.
132. Id.
133. Id. The potential impact of a water sale on water flows into Arkansas is a consideration,
and any contract for sale would have to comply with water diversion stipulations found in the
Red River Compact. State parties to the Red River Compact include Oklahoma, Arkansas,
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in early 2002 because the two sides could not agree on how much the water was
worth, but both sides remain optimistic that talks will continue in the future.
34
The NTWA water sale proposal drew significant attention because of the
popular perception that a water sale to Texas would deprive Oklahomans of
sufficient water resources to meet their future needs. Some circles of opinion
took the view that Oklahoma water should be used only in Oklahoma; however,
restricting the interstate transfer of water could be found unconstitutional under
the dormant commerce clause as imposing an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.
35
B. Oklahoma City Water Utilities Trust (OCWUT)
The second proposal the OWRB pursued came from OCWUT. OWRB and
tribal discussions with OCWUT produced two options to increase the central
Oklahoma water supply.136 One option would allow a diversion of water from
the Kiamichi River Basin or would allow OCWUT to use water from Sardis
Lake. 137 The other option would be a combination that would utilize mostly
water diverted from the Kiamichi River Basin, with limited use of water storage
in Sardis Lake. 38 Lake levels and river flows would not be significantly
impacted by this arrangement, but further environmental studies would be done
to ensure protection of wildlife habitats.'39 If OCWUT agreed to use solely
Sardis Lake storage water, it would also agree to repay the federal government
the approximately $38 million owed by the State for Sardis Lake's
construction. 4 OCWUT could choose instead to use Kiamichi River Basin
waters at no cost because they are public waters.""
Texas, and Louisiana. Id. at 32.
134. Id. at 25; see also Letter from NTWA to Governor Keating, available at http://www.
owrb.state.ok.us/studies/legislative/southeast/se-plan.php#status (expressing NTWA's hope for
future negotiations).
135. Choctaw Nation Memorandum, supra note 31, at 8; see Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941 (1982).
136. Status Report, supra note 21, at 40.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 42.
140. Id. at 43.
141. Id.
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VIII. Public Concerns
On an issue as broad as water rights and water sales, some state citizens will
understandably have legitimate concerns. Citizens' groups, such as the
Southern Oklahoma Water Alliance, have voiced several concerns about the
proposed Compact and the consequences of out-of-state water sales.
A. Water Ownership
Concern about original ownership of water rights and the role of the Tribes
in the water sale contracts has surfaced, but as shown above, the Choctaws and
Chickasaws have a nonfrivolous claim to these waters. State advisors were
convinced that the Tribes showed a sufficiently valid claim to the water and
recommended that the State pursue a compact with the Tribes. If the Compact
is enacted, the State will have saved the taxpayers a significant amount in
potential litigation costs. As neither side knew what the litigation result would
be, it was prudent to negotiate a compact instead and to agree on a split of water
sale revenues. The State will control the Tribes' water and administration rights,
while the Tribes will receive half of all water sale revenues.'42 This is a
compromise that benefits both parties.
B. Private Negotiations
An initial complaint from citizens was that negotiations with Texas regarding
a possible water sale did not allow for public input.'43 But Duane Smith,
executive director of the OWRB, says this was necessary to keep making
progress. "'It's a very difficult process to negotiate a contract in public when it
changes at virtually any meeting that's done,' he said.""' Because the Compact
and any water sale contract must be approved by the Oklahoma legislature, there
is opportunity for public examination and further negotiation if necessary.
C. Downstream Dependency
Citizens' groups have also been very vocal about what they term
"downstream dependency" issues. The concern is that once Texas becomes
dependent on the Oklahoma water source, courts would force Oklahoma to
142. Carter, supra note 90.
143. Kelly Kurt, New Deal Brings Competing Economic Visions, J. REC. (Okla. City), Nov.
12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4527444.
144. Id.
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continue to uphold that obligation indefinitely.'45 Oklahoma Governor Frank
Keating, Chief Gregory E. Pyle of the Choctaw Nation, and Governor Bill
Anoatubby of the Chickasaw Nation asked Oklahoma attorney and Oklahoma
College of Law professor Drew L. Kershen to address these concerns in a legal
opinion in November 2001.'4 Professor Kershen divided his opinion into
answering two questions.'47 The first was "whether the concept of downstream
dependency or any analogous dependency arguments had legal merit," and the
second was whether a "contractual waiver of any downstream dependency
claims" that might exist would be valid. 4 s
In response to the first question on the legal merit of "downstream
dependency," Professor Kershen found only one legal reference to this term, 49
but pursued research of "analogous concepts in four distinct areas"'5° to
determine the merits of this type of argument. 5' The first area he researched
concerned "[p]ersons with state prior appropriation rights dependent upon water
claimed by tribal nations."' 52 He found that, "[no matter how dependent
citizens of Oklahoma have become upon the use of water obtained under the
laws of the State of Oklahoma, these Oklahoma dependencies will not trump the
legal rights of tribal nations to water within the boundaries of the State of
Oklahoma."'53
The second area Professor Kershen researched was the "Equitable
Apportionment of Interstate Streams between Sovereigns."' 54 This area would
encompass litigation between states concerning water rights. Professor Kershen
concluded that "the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the
equitable apportionment of interstate streams between sovereigns protects the
upstream state in its water rights [despite the fact that] the downstream state...
may be adversely affected."'
' 55
145. Carter, supra note 90.
146. Legal Opinion from Drew L. Kershen, Oklahoma attorney and Earl Sneed Centennial
Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law, to Chickasaw Governor Anoatubby,
Choctaw Chief Pyle, and Oklahoma Governor Keating (Nov. 11, 2001) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Kershen Legal Opinion].
147. Id. at 1.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2-3; see, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas,
320 U.S. 383 (1943); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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The next area Professor Kershen researched was the "Temporary Transfer of
Water Rights."' 56 Professor Kershen asserted that state water law in most states
"establishes that these temporary transfers [of water rights] automatically expire
at the end of the term of the temporary transfer and that all water rights
automatically revert to the original water rights holder."'
15 7
The final area Professor Kershen researched was "Irrigation Run-off and
Seepage and Developed Water."1 58 Professor Kershen determined that "the
clear majority of courts have also held the neighboring landowner, who has
become accustomed to using the seepage water or run-off, has only a dependent
water right." 59
As a result of his research, Professor Kershen was able to conclude that a
"downstream dependency" or analogous claim by the State of Texas against the
State of Oklahoma would not have merit and would not be upheld. "
Professor Kershen also addressed the validity of a "contractual waiver of any
downstream dependency claims" in his legal opinion. 6' He found that
Oklahoma statutes as currently written would support stopping the flow of a
water supply to a purchaser of water under terms of a negotiated contract. 162 in
addition, an express waiver of water use rights, or "downstream dependency"
rights, would be upheld as a valid waiver provision under contract law. 163
D. Environmental Impact
Environmental concerns also abound."6 Because no official plan of action
for utilizing southeastern Oklahoma's waters has been adopted, the state has not
completed appropriate environmental studies. 65 OWRB officials are confident,
however, that the State will adhere to state and federal environmental
156. Kershen Legal Opinion, supra note 146, at 4.
157. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1735-1737 (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-106
(2003); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 46-5-38 to 46-5-40 (Michie 2003).
158. Kershen Legal Opinion, supra note 146, at 4.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id. at 5-6.
161. Id. at 6.
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id. at 8.
164. See Marie Price, Controversial Water Compact Headed to Legislature, J. REC. (Okla.
City), Oct. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4526964.
165. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Status Report on the Joint State/Tribal Water
Compact and Water Marketing Proposals, Questions & Answers: State/Tribal Water Compact
& Southeast Water Development Plan 2 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.owrb.state.ok.us/
studies/legislative/southeast/se-plan.php#status.
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regulations before approving a course of conduct."6 There have also been some
questions about the possible sale of groundwater, but contract terms expressly
state that no groundwater will ever be sold.167 The Draft Water Contract with
the NTWA stipulates that "the parties agree that the Water for sale and use out
of State under this Contract is limited to surface water that is in excess of the
needs of Oklahoma; and.., no water from groundwater sources will be included
in any such sale to NTWA."'68 The State/Tribal Compact also includes terms
that expressly prohibit the sale of groundwater.'69
E. Limited Water Supply
Others have been concerned that a sale of water to Texas could negatively
impact the growth potential of Oklahoma cities. One view is that if water is
such a valuable resource for continued economic growth, Oklahoma should use
all the water it has available for its own economic development. 7 ' One
opponent of the proposed water sale to Texas was reluctant to pipe water to
Texas because "'[i]t's not that they need our water. It's not a humanitarian
situation right now .... They're just water hogs."""' Along this same vein,
some Oklahomans feel that the State should not run the risk that it will one day
face a water shortage due to water sale contracts with other states.
172
In response to these types of concerns, in December 2001, Jones & Stokes,
independent consultants from California retained by the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Tribes to advise them on water issues raised by the Compact,
published a Review of Issues and Assumptions on the proposed water sale
contract with the NTWA. 173 Their review tracked projected water levels in each
phase of the proposed sale to the NTWA and determined percentages of use in
each phase.'74 Percentages of use were determined by studying the last seventy-
166. Id.
167. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Status Report on the Joint State/Tribal Water
Compact and WaterMarketing Proposals, Draft Inter-Regional Water Supply Contract 5 (Mar.
2002), available at http://www.owrb.state.ok.us/studies/legislative/southeast/se-plan.php#
status.
168. Id.
169. Water Compact, supra note 91, at 8.
170. See Kurt, supra note 143.
171. Id. (quoting Charlette Hearne, Oklahoma citizen and opponent of the Compact).
172. See id.
173. Choctaw & Chickasaw Tribes - Oklahoma State Proposed Water Transfer Contract,
Review of Issues and Assumptions by Jones & Stokes, Independent Consultants, to the Choctaw
and Chickasaw Tribes 1-6 (Dec. 5, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jones & Stokes].
174. See id.
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five years worth of data of the annual volume of Kiamichi River runoff flowing
into Hugo Reservoir.T' The study placed emphasis on the lowest runoff, second
lowest runoff, and the range of runoff amounts in 90% of the years studied.
176
These numbers are important because parties to water sale contracts must agree
that the water provided to fulfill a contract must be water in excess of the
amount needed to keep the reservoir elevations at acceptable minimum levels "to
fully protect recreation and wildlife benefits."'177 This history can also be used
to simulate future data to ensure that Oklahoma's water needs will be met before
any water is sold.'78
Historical data shows that the median runoff of the Kiamichi River at Hugo
is 1.5 million acre-feet per year.'79 In the NTWA water sale contract proposal,
discussions were centered around annual sales of approximately 120,000 acre
feet in the twenty-year Phase 1. 80 This sale proposal would allow access to only
8% of the total runoff in the average year from the Kiamichi River basin into the
Hugo Reservoir. 8 ' Even in the very driest year on record since 1925, water
runoff totaled 360,000 acre-feet into Hugo.1 2 Had the NTWA water sale
contract been in place at that time, a sale of 120,000 acre-feet would still have
consumed only 33% of the total water runofffor that particular year, 83 and, in
total, "would only have lowered Hugo reservoir one foot."'"
The Compact also contains language that requires any water sale contract to
contain language authorizing alteration or cancellation of the contract during
175. Id. at 2.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 7.
180. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Status Report on the Joint State/Tribal Water
Compact and WaterMarketing Proposals, Draft Inter-Regional Water Supply Contract, Exhibit
C2 (Mar. 2002), available athttp://www.owrb.state.ok.us/studiesllegislative/southeast/se-plan.
php#status. In Phase II, the volume of water available for sale would increase to 160,000 acre-
feet per year, and in Phase III, it would increase to 320,000 acre-feet per year, with additional
supply coming from the Little River and Mountain Fork River Basins.
181. See Jones & Stokes, supra note 173, at 7 fig.l. The median runoff into the Hugo
Reservoir is 1,500,000 acre-feet per year. If 120,000 acre-feet of that runoff were sold each
year, the water sold would total only 8% of the total runoff available on an annual basis.
182. Id. at 2. The driest year on record since 1925 was 1963, when there was a runoff of
360,000 acre-feet into Hugo. The second driest year on record since 1925 was 1956, when the
runoff totaled 450,000 acre-feet.
183. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Readers should carefully note that selling 33% of available
runoff for a single dry year translates into selling only a tiny portion of water reserves available
in the Hugo Reservoir at any given time.
184. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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times of drought. 185 State and tribal leadership want to ensure that the water
needs of the people of Oklahoma are met before any water is sold to third
parties.
Public interest in an issue as important as compacting for water rights and
negotiating water sale contracts is a good thing. When the issue is looked at
objectively, it seems that public concerns can be addressed and that small
compromises will gain large rewards in potential positive impact for the State,
the Tribes, and their people.
IX. Benefits of the Compact Outweigh Its Drawbacks
As noted, a successful compact negotiation requires concessions from both
parties to reach a compromise. In the Oklahoma Compact, the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Tribes will lose some autonomy and authority over how their water
is used. The biggest drawback of the Compact for the Tribes seems to be the
broad release of water rights claims and administrative authority.
Benefits to the Tribes, however, outweigh any potential drawbacks. If the
Compact is enacted, the Tribes will have avoided the expense and turmoil of
litigation and lowered administrative costs since the State will be responsible for
administrative duties. Because water sale efforts will be coordinated with the
State through the Commission, there is a better chance that an outside contract
will be reached and the economic benefits of such a sale will become a reality.
The Tribes have also retained a right to arbitration in many situations, so they
will be able to influence future proposals that may affect their land and
members. The Tribes also will still have a voice in state water quality standards
and may still apply under the Clean Water Act for TAS status to protect their
own water quality standards.
In summary, the Oklahoma State/Tribal Water Compact is a progressive step
towards efficient compromise for the greater good of the people of southeastern
Oklahoma.
185. Water Compact, supra note 91, at 8.
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